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Summary. A new standard is proposed for the evidential assessment of replication studies.
The approach combines a specific reverse Bayes technique with prior-predictive tail probabili-
ties to define replication success.The method gives rise to a quantitative measure for replication
success, called the sceptical p-value. The sceptical p-value integrates traditional significance
of both the original and the replication study with a comparison of the respective effect sizes.
It incorporates the uncertainty of both the original and the replication effect estimates and re-
duces to the ordinary p-value of the replication study if the uncertainty of the original effect
estimate is ignored. The framework proposed can also be used to determine the power or the
required replication sample size to achieve replication success. Numerical calculations highlight
the difficulty of achieving replication success if the evidence from the original study is only sug-
gestive. An application to data from the Open Science Collaboration project on the replicability
of psychological science illustrates the methodology proposed.
Keywords: Power; Prior–data conflict; Replication success; Reverse Bayes technique;
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1. Introduction
Replicability of research findings is crucial to the credibility of all empirical domains of science.
As a consequence of the so-called replication crisis (Ioannidis, 2005; Begley and Ioannidis,
2015), recent years have witnessed increasing interest in large-scale replication projects, e.g.
Open Science Collaboration (2015) and Camerer et al. (2016, 2018). Such efforts help to assess
to what extent claims of new discoveries can be confirmed in independent replication studies
whose procedures are as closely matched to the original studies as possible.
However, there is no established standard for the statistical evaluation of replication success.
Standard significance of the replication study is often used as a criterion, but significance alone
does not take the effect sizes of the original and replication study into account and can easily
lead to conclusions that are the opposite to what the evidence warrants (Simonsohn, 2015).
A comparison of the effect sizes of the original and replication study is also common, where
a smaller replication effect estimate decreases the credibility of the original study result. A
modification of this is to investigate whether the replication effect estimate is compatible with the
original effect estimate (Bayarri and Mayoral, 2002; Patil et al., 2016). Meta-analytic approaches
take the results from the original and replication study at face value and combine them into an
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overall effect size estimate. However, when conducting a replication, researchers are challenging
the original study and asking whether they should take it at face value. This is an inherently
asymmetric question, where exchangeability assumptions are not appropriate and alternative
methods for evidence quantification are needed.
Recently the lack of a single accepted definition of replicability has been emphasized by
Goodman et al. (2016) who called for a better understanding of the relationship between re-
producibility and the truth of scientific claims. Researchers have started to develop Bayesian
methods to analyse and design replication studies (Verhagen and Wagenmakers, 2014; van Aert
and van Assen, 2017; Schönbrodt and Wagenmakers, 2018), but there is a lack of appropriate
methodology based on traditional metrics (effect estimates, confidence intervals and p-values).
To address this deficiency, I propose a principled approach, combining the analysis of credibility
(Matthews, 2001a, b) with the prior criticism approach by Box (1980) and Evans and Moshonov
(2006) to define replication success (Section 2). This gives rise to a new quantitative measure of
replication success: the sceptical p-value (Section 3).
The sceptical p-value has attractive properties. It takes into account the results from both the
original and the replication study and is always larger than the ordinary p-values from these
studies. If the uncertainty of the original effect estimate is ignored, the sceptical p-value reduces
to the ordinary p-value from the replication study. Moreover, the sceptical p-value considers
replication studies with relatively small effect estimates (compared with the original estimates) as
less successful. To avoid the so-called replication paradox (Ly et al., 2018), a one-sided sceptical
p-value is derived within the framework proposed, ensuring that replication success can occur
only if the original and replication effect estimates have the same sign.
Statistical power is of central importance in assessing the reliability of science (Button et al.,
2013). Appropriate design of a replication study is key to tackling the replication crisis as many
such studies are currently severely underpowered, even by traditional standards (Anderson
and Maxwell, 2017). Methods to calculate the power for replication success are proposed in
Section 4. Numerical calculations highlight the difficulty of achieving replication success if the
evidence from the original study is only suggestive. The framework is also used to determine the
sample size required to achieve replication success with appropriate power. Section 5 presents
a reanalysis of data from the Open Science Collaboration (2015) project on the replicability
of psychological science to illustrate the usefulness of the methodology proposed. I close with
some comments in Section 6.
2. Assessment of replication success
Analysis of credibility (Matthews, 2001a, b) is a reverse Bayes procedure which was originally
designed to assess the credibility of significant findings in the light of existing evidence. The
discussion of Matthews (2001b) and his response provide additional insights on the philosophy
and detail of this method. The idea to use Bayes’s theorem in reverse originates in the work
of I. J. Good (Good, 1950, 1983) and is increasingly used to assess the plausibility of scientific
findings (Greenland, 2006, 2011; Held, 2013; Colquhoun, 2017, 2019).
2.1. Reverse Bayes analysis
Analysis of credibility combines a significant effect estimate from the original study with a
sceptical prior (Spiegelhalter et al. (1994), section 4.1.3): a normal distribution centred near
zero to represent doubts about large effect estimates. A sceptical prior shrinks the original effect
estimate towards 0, where the amount of shrinkage depends on the sceptical prior variance.
Analysis and Design of Replication Studies 433
Fletcher et al. (1993) have argued for the use of sceptical priors for original clinical study
results, which often show a tendency for overoptimism.
To challenge the original study it is natural to ask how sceptical we would have to be not to
find its apparently positive effect estimate convincing. This leads to a reverse Bayes approach,
where the posterior is fixed to have a lower (or upper) credible limit exactly equal to 0 and the
sceptical prior variance is chosen accordingly. The approach thus represents the objection by a
sceptic who argues that the original result would no longer be ‘significant’ if combined with a
sufficiently sceptical prior. The goal is now to persuade the sceptic by showing that this prior is
unrealistic. To do so, a replication study is conducted. If the data from the replication study are
in conflict with the sufficiently sceptical prior, the original study result is confirmed.
Suppose that the original study gives rise to a conventional confidence interval (CI) for the
unknown effect size θ at level 1−α with lower limit L and upper limit U. Assume that L and U
are symmetric around the original point estimate θ̂o (assumed to be normally distributed) and
that both are either positive or negative, i.e. the original effect is significant at significance level
α. After a suitable transformation this framework covers a large number of commonly used
effect measures such as differences in means, odds ratios, relative risks and correlations.
We first need to compute the variance of the sufficiently sceptical prior. Matthews (2001a)
has shown that the equitailed credible interval of the sufficiently sceptical prior at level 1 −α







is the scepticism limit (Matthews, 2018). Note that equation (1) holds for any value of α, not
just for the traditional 5% level. The sufficiently sceptical prior variance τ2 can be derived from
equation (1) and expressed as a function of the variance σ2o (the squared standard error, which
is assumed to be known) of the estimate θ̂o, the corresponding test statistic to = θ̂o=σo and zα=2,









α=2 holds because of significance of the original study at level α.
Equation (2) shows that the sufficiently sceptical prior variance τ2 can be both smaller or
larger than σ2o, depending on the value of t
2
o. For a ‘borderline’ significant result where t
2
o is close
to z2α=2, the sufficiently sceptical prior variance will be relatively large. If t
2
o is substantially larger
than z2α=2, then the sufficiently sceptical prior variance will be relatively small.
The left-hand part of Fig. 1 shows an example of this procedure. The original study has effect
estimate θ̂o =0:57 (95% CI from L=0:25 to U =0:89) and two-sided p-value po =0:0005. The
scepticism limit, calculated from equation (1), turns out to be S =0:22.
2.2. Assessing prior–data conflict
The replication study that is shown in the right-hand part of Fig. 1 has an effect estimate of
θ̂r = 0:33 (95% CI from 0.01 to 0.65; pr = 0:046). If the replication result is in conflict with the
sufficiently sceptical prior, the original result is deemed credible. A visual comparison of the
sufficiently sceptical prior with the replication study result in the right-hand part of Fig. 1 can



























Reverse−Bayes analysis Assessing prior−data conflict
Fig. 1. Example of the assessment of replication success: the original study has effect estimate θ̂o D0:57
(95% CI from L D 0:25 to U D 0:89) and two-sided p-value po D 0:0005; the left-hand part of the figure
illustrates the reverse Bayes derivation of the sufficiently sceptical prior with scepticism limit S D0:22 based
on the original study result and the posterior with lower credible limit fixed at zero; the comparison of the
sufficiently sceptical prior with the replication study result (θ̂r D0:33; 95% CI from 0.01 to 0.65; pr D0:046) in
the right-hand part of the figure is used to assess potential prior–data conflict
One option is to consider the original study as credible, if the absolute value of the effect
estimate θ̂r from the replication study is larger than the scepticism limit S (Matthews, 2001a, b).
In the above example the effect estimate in the replication study (θ̂r = 0:33) is larger than the
scepticism limit (S = 0:22), so the original study would be considered credible at the 5% level.
However, a disadvantage of this approach is that it does not take the (known) variance σ2r of the
replication estimate θ̂r (in what follows also assumed to be normally distributed) into account.
To address this issue, I propose to quantify prior–data conflict based on the prior-predictive
distribution of θ̂r: a normal distribution with mean 0 and variance τ
2 +σ2r (Spiegelhalter et al.
(2004), section 5.8). This is the established way to check the compatibility of prior and data





and the tail probability pBox =Pr{χ2.1/ t2Box} as the corresponding upper tail of a χ2-distribu-
tion with 1 degree of freedom. Small values of pBox indicate a conflict between the sufficiently
sceptical prior and the estimate from the replication study and I define replication success at





In the example that is shown in Fig. 1, the prior-predictive assessment of conflict gives tBox =
1:65 with Box’s tail probability pBox =0:098 > 0:05, so the replication study is not successful at
the 5% level, although both the original and the replication study are significant at that level.
This illustrates that replication success is a more stringent criterion than significance alone.
For α = 10%, Box’s tail probability is somewhat smaller .pBox = 0:078/, and we can declare
replication success at the 10% level.
The example illustrates how Box’s tail probability can be used to assess replication success at
level α. However, it is difficult to interpret the actual value of pBox as it depends on the choice
of α. Furthermore, assessment of replication success is only possible if the original study result
is significant at level α as otherwise the sufficiently sceptical prior would not exist and pBox
could not be computed. These issues motivate the work that is described in the next section
where I introduce the sceptical p-value: a quantitative measure for replication success that is
independent of the level α.
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3. The sceptical p-value
Instead of dichotomizing replication studies into successful yes or no at some arbitrary level
α, I now propose the sceptical p-value pS to assess replication success quantitatively. The idea
is to determine the largest confidence level 1−pS for the original confidence interval, at which
we can declare replication success at level pS. This parallels the duality of ordinary p-values
and CIs, where the largest confidence level 1 − p at which we can declare significance can be
used to compute the ordinary p-value p. Replication success at any prespecified level α is then
equivalent to pS α, just as significance at level α is equivalent to pα.
To determine pS, let c=σ2o=σ2r denote the ratio of the variances of the original and replication
effect estimates and let tr = θ̂r=σr denote the test statistic of the replication study. With equation










Using equations (3) and (4), the requirement t2Box = θ̂
2
r =.τ
2 +σ2r / z2α=2 for replication success
at level α can be written as
.t2o=z
2
α=2 −1/.t2r =z2α=2 −1/ c; .5/





r must also hold to ensure that the left-hand side of equation (5) is positive. The
required squared quantile z2S = z2pS=2 to obtain equality in expression (5) must therefore fulfil





and defines the sceptical p-value pS =2{1−Φ.|zS|/} via
.t2o=z
2
S −1/.t2r =z2S −1/= c: .7/





Equation (7) can be rewritten as





where t2A = .t2o + t2r /=2 is the arithmetical and t
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H = 2=.1=t2o + 1=t2r / the harmonic mean of the
squared test statistics t2o and t
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H}]− t2A} for c =1:
.9/
In the introductory example the original and the replication CIs have the same width, so c=1
and z2S is simply half the harmonic mean of t
2
o =12:19 and t2r =3:99, i.e. z2S =3:00, |zS|=1:73 and
pS = 2{1 −Φ.1:73/}= 0:083. We can thus declare replication success at any prespecified level
α0:083.
3.1. Properties
Inequalities (6) imply that the sceptical p-value pS is always larger than both the original and




with increasing t2o (for fixed t
2
r and c) and also with increasing t
2
r (for fixed t
2
o and c). Therefore,
the smaller po (or pr) is, the smaller pS (for fixed c). Furthermore, for fixed test statistics to and
tr (so fixed p-values po and pr), the solution z
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o. In other words, for
the same ordinary p-values po and pr, the sceptical p-value pS increases with decreasing absolute
replication effect estimate relative to the original effect estimate. This is a desired property, as
replication studies with smaller effect estimates than the original estimates are considered less
credible (Simonsohn, 2015).
To illustrate the dependence of pS on the variance ratio c, consider a scenario where po =




r . First assume equal effect sizes θ̂r = θ̂o, so c = 1.
The sceptical p-value turns out to be pS =0:069. For θ̂r = θ̂o=2 (c =4) we obtain a larger value
(pS = 0:14) because the effect estimate θ̂r of the replication study is just half as large as the
original estimate θ̂o. In contrast, for θ̂r = 2θ̂o (c = 14 ) the sceptical p-value becomes smaller
(pS =0:035). This asymmetry in the incorporation of the original and replication study data is
natural, placing less weight on replication studies with relatively small effect estimates. This is
so in the introductory example, where substantial shrinkage of the replication effect estimate
leads to a relatively large sceptical p-value.
It is also interesting to study limiting values of the sceptical p-value. If we let σ2o ↓ 0 for
fixed θ̂o = 0, equation (8) reduces to the requirement z2S = t2r , as shown in Appendix B. Thus,
the ordinary p-value of the replication study is a special case of the sceptical p-value if the
uncertainty of the original effect estimate is ignored. In contrast, ignoring the uncertainty of






with d = θ̂2r =θ̂
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assess replication success corresponds to the Matthews (2001a, b) approach that was mentioned
in Section 2.2. For any value of d, z2M is smaller than t
2
o but can be larger than t
2
r . Ignoring
the uncertainty of the replication effect estimate may thus lead to the declaration of replication
success, even if the replication study is not conventionally significant on its own.
We may also consider the case c ↓ 0 for fixed t2o and t2r , where expression (9) increases with
limit
z2S ↑min{t2o, t2r }, .11/
as shown in Appendix C. Therefore pS ↓max{po, pr} for c↓0, which we shall use in Section 3.4.
3.2. Relationship to intrinsic credibility
The concept of intrinsic credibility has been proposed in Matthews (2018) and adapted in Held
(2019) to check the credibility of ‘out of the blue’ findings without any prior support. In the
present context this corresponds to an original study in the absence of a replication study. The
idea is to evaluate the credibility of the original study if we could observe exactly the same result
in the replication study.
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The approach by Matthews (2018) corresponds to the case where we ignore the uncer-
tainty of the (hypothetical) replication study and thus leads to equation (10) with d = 1: z2M =
{.
√
5−1/=2}t2o ≈0:618t2o. However, if we incorporate the uncertainty by using the prior-predictive
approach by Box (1980), then we obtain z2S = 0:5t2o as a special case of expression (9) for c = 1




as proposed in Held (2019) for the assessment of claims of new discoveries. Intrinsic credibility








is the p-value threshold for intrinsic credibility. For α=0:05 we obtain αIC =0:0056; for α=0:10
we have αIC =0:02. These thresholds will become important in Section 4.
3.3. One-sided sceptical p-values
The procedure that was described above is designed for standard two-sided CIs and assesses
replication success in a two-sided fashion, as the sign of θ̂r does not matter in the computation
of the sceptical p-value. In extreme cases, it may therefore happen that a replication study is
classified as successful although the signs of θ̂o and θ̂r differ. This ‘replication paradox’ may
also occur in a Bayes factor approach; see Ly et al. (2018) for details.
It is therefore of interest to adapt the sceptical p-value to the one-sided setting. Without loss
of generality consider the one-sided alternative H1 :θ>0 to H0 :θ=0 and assume that θ̂o >0. We
now start with a one-sided CI for θ at level 1− α̃ whose lower limit θ̂o − zα̃σo equals the lower
limit L of the corresponding two-sided CI at level 1 − 2α̃. The variance τ2 of the sufficiently
sceptical prior therefore is equation (2) with zα=2 replaced by zα̃.
The obvious one-sided requirement for replication success tBox = θ̂r=
√
.τ2 +σ2r /  zα̃ now
replaces the two-sided requirement t2Box  z
2
α=2 and ensures that the replication paradox cannot
occur. If θ̂r  0, we can hence still use expression (9) to compute z
2
S from to, tr and c and the
one-sided sceptical p-value turns out to be p̃S =1−Φ.zS/, so half of the two-sided sceptical p-
value: p̃S =pS=2. The same relationship holds between ordinary one- and two-sided p-values, of
course, which implies that the one-sided sceptical p-value p̃S is always larger than the ordinary
one-sided p-values p̃o and p̃r from the two studies. If the replication effect estimate is in the
wrong direction, i.e. θ̂r < 0, it is natural to set p̃S =1−pS=2.
One-sided sceptical p-values are appropriate if the study protocol of the original study is
already formulated in a one-sided fashion. A post hoc (after the original study result is known)
formulation of a one-sided alternative would require halving the original two-sided significance
level α to α̃=α=2. The one-sided assessment of replication success at level α̃ is then equivalent
to the two-sided procedure at the original level α, if the signs of the original and replication
effect estimates agree. This procedure ensures that the replication paradox cannot occur.
However, the one-sided p-value mapping (from p̃o and p̃r to p̃S) will be different from the
corresponding two-sided mapping (from po and pr to pS) because the same ordinary one- and
two-sided p-values correspond to different test statistics to and tr. For numerical illustration
suppose that p̃o = p̃r = 0:01 (so po = pr = 0:02 and to = tr = 2:33) and that θ̂o and θ̂r are both
positive. Then p̃S = 0:05 for c = 1, p̃S = 0:09 for c = 4 and p̃S = 0:029 for c = 14 . These one-
sided sceptical p-values are slightly smaller than the two-sided sceptical p-values for two-sided
po =pr =0:01 (where to = tr =2:58), as reported in Section 3.1 (pS =0:069, 0.14, 0.035 for c=1,
4, 1
4
respectively). This illustrates that the one-sided assessment of replication success based on
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Fig. 2. Density function of the sceptical p-value for various values of the variance ratio c under the as-
sumption of no effect: the density for the limiting case c!0 as well as the density of the p-value for intrinsic
credibility and the ordinary p-value are also shown
one-sided ordinary p-values is slightly less stringent than the two-sided assessment based on
two-sided ordinary p-values, if the original and replication effect estimates have the same sign.
3.4. The distribution under the null
It is interesting to compare the distributions of po (or pr), pIC and pS under the assumption of
no effect, where the ordinary p-value is uniformly distributed. We can easily derive the density
of pIC with a change-of-variables by using equation (12): f.pIC/= 2
√
πϕ{t.pIC/}; here ϕ.·/ is
the standard normal density function and t.pIC/=Φ−1.1−pIC=2/.
The distribution of pS can be studied via stochastic simulation. Density estimates are displayed
in Fig. 2 for various values of the variance ratio c based on 5×106 samples each. We can see that
the risk of small ‘false positive’ sceptical p-values is drastically reduced, compared with ordinary
p-values based on one study only. Note that the variance is usually inversely proportional to the
sample size of each study, i.e. σ2o =κ2=no and σ2r =κ2=nr for some unit variance κ2, say. Then
c=nr=no, so the variance factor c is increasing with increasing sample size nr of the replication
study. The distribution of pS in Fig. 2 is shifted to the right with increasing c, so an increasing
sample size of the replication study reduces the risk of a false claim of replication success.
From expression (11) we know that for c↓0 we have pS ↓max{po, pr}, which follows a trian-
gular Be.2, 1/ distribution if po and pr are independently uniform. The corresponding density
function is shown in Fig. 2, as well as the density function of po and pIC. The triangular distribu-
tion gives the upper bound α2 for the tail probability Pr.pS α |H0/ for sufficiently small α and
any value of the variance ratio c. For example, for α=0:05 we obtain Pr.pS 0:05 |H0/0:0025
for any c. This is to be compared with Pr.po 0:05 |H0/=0:05 and Pr.pIC 0:05 |H0/=0:0056.
However, α2 is not a particularly sharp bound. If, for example, the replication sample size equals
the original sample size (c=1), then Pr.pS 0:05 |H0/≈0:0001 is much smaller than 0.0025.
4. Power and sample size calculations
Replication success is not only a function of the two p-values from the original and replication
study, but also of sample size, which enters in the variance ratio c. The computation of the power
Analysis and Design of Replication Studies 439
or the required replication sample size to achieve replication success is hence more challenging
than in standard sample size calculations. A larger sample size will be required since replica-
tion success (which is defined as pS α) implies significance of the replication study (pr α).
Furthermore, the sample size required will depend on the p-value po from the original study.
The Bayesian assessment of sample size uses a design prior (O’Hagan and Stevens, 2001;
O’Hagan et al., 2005) to express prior beliefs about the true effect size. To power a study for
replication success, the results from the original study will thus enter in two ways: as design
prior for the effect size and in the subsequent assessment of replication success. For the former
I shall distinguish two cases: a normal prior with mean θ̂o and variance σ
2
o and a point prior
at θ̂o. The normal prior incorporates the uncertainty of θ̂o whereas the point prior does not, by
analogy with the concepts of predictive and conditional power in clinical trials (Spiegelhalter
and Freedman, 1986; Spiegelhalter et al., 1986).
Suppose that no is the size of the original study sample and nr the sample size of the replication
study, so σ2o =κ2=no and σ2r =κ2=nr, where κ2 is the unit variance from one observation. Then
c=nr=no, which would also hold in a balanced two-sample design with respective sample sizes no
and nr per group. Under an initial uniform prior for θ, the sampling distribution θ̂o ∼N.θ, σ2o/
of the original study now serves as prior distribution θ | θ̂o ∼ N.θ̂o, σ2o/ with prior-predictive
distribution













for the observed effect θ̂r in the replication study. Then t
2
r follows a scaled non-central χ
2-
distribution with 1 degree of freedom, scaling factor 1+c and non-centrality parameter t2o=.1+
1=c/, as shown in Appendix D. For the alternative point prior at θ= θ̂o, t2r follows a non-central
χ2-distribution with 1 degree of freedom and non-centrality parameter λ= ct2o.
To compute the power for replication success, the relative sample size c=nr=no in equation (9)
is fixed. Then z2S and the sceptical p-value pS are monotone functions of t
2
r and we can compute
the power for replication success at any level α. We can also calculate the required relative sample
size c =nr=no at some predefined power for replication success. Both tasks require application
of numerical root finding algorithms. Computational details are omitted here.
4.1. Power calculations
Fig. 3 compares the power for significance with the power for replication success for a replication
study with sample size equal to the original study .c = 1/ at level α= 5% as a function of the
two-sided p-value po of the original study. Power calculations for significance aim to detect
the effect estimate θ̂o from the original study with a standard two-sided significance test. Not
accounting for the associated uncertainty corresponds to the concept of conditional power,
whereas predictive power calculations are based on a normal design prior with mean θ̂o and
variance σ2o (Spiegelhalter et al. (2004), equation (6.4)). The results are in accordance with those
reported in Goodman (1992). In particular, for po =0:05 the power is 50% both for conditional
and for predictive power with conditional power increasing faster than predictive power for
smaller p-values po.
Conditional and predictive power for replication success is also shown in Fig. 3 for two-sided
α=5% and one-sided α̃=5%. As expected, the power for replication success is lower than for
significance and drops quickly to 0 for values of po that are close to 0.05. Remarkably, in the
two-sided case, a conditional and predictive power of 50% is attained at po = 0:0056. This is
the threshold (13) for intrinsic credibility at level α = 5%, as described in Section 3.2. In the
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Fig. 3. Power calculations for a replication study with sample size equal to the original study .c D 1/:
shown is conditional ( , , ) and predictive ( , , ) power for significance
(two-sided) ( , ) and for replication success ( , , one sided; , , two
sided) at level α D 5% as a function of the two-sided p-value of the original study; the one- and two-sided
thresholds for intrinsic credibility are marked in red on the x-axis
one-sided case a power of 50% is obtained at po =0:02: the threshold for intrinsic credibility at
two-sided level α= 10%. Therefore, only intrinsically credible results (based on the threshold
(13)) ensure that the power for success of an identically designed replication study exceeds 50%.
This intriguing feature highlights the difficulty of achieving replication success if the evidence
from the original study is only suggestive and provides a new argument for more stringent
p-value thresholds for claims of new discoveries (Johnson, 2013; Benjamin et al., 2018; Ioannidis,
2018; Held, 2019).
This surprising result can be explained as follows: if the non-centrality parameter λ of a non-
central χ2.1/ distribution is reasonably large, say λ>4, then the median is approximately equal
to λ. Under the point prior and for c = 1, the non-centrality parameter of the distribution of
t2r is λ= t2o, so Med.t2r / ≈ t2o. The sceptical p-value pS = 2{1 −Φ.zS/} is then defined through
z2S = t2H=2 = .1=t2o + 1=t2r /−1, so the median of z2S is approximately t2o=2. Replication success is
thus achieved with 50% probability for z2α=2 = z2S ≈ t2o=2, i.e. t2o ≈2z2α=2. This corresponds to the
intrinsic credibility threshold (13) for the ordinary p-value po from the original study.
We obtain essentially the same result under the normal prior, where now λ = t2o=2, which
combined with a scaling factor of 2 also leads to Med.t2r /≈ t2o for sufficiently large t2o. The rest
of the argument is as above, but note that this approximation is slightly less precise, because the
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Fig. 4. Relative sample size cDnr=no to achieve significance ( , two sided) and replication success
( , one sided; , two sided) with 80% conditional ( , , ) or predictive ( ,
, ) power for αD0:05 as a function of the original two-sided p-value po: the one- and two-sided
thresholds for intrinsic credibility are marked in red on the x-axis
non-centrality parameter is half as large as under the point prior. The approximation is, however,
still very good: for α= 5%, the exact power for replication success at po = 2{1 −Φ.
√
2z0:025/}
is 50.00001% for the point prior and 50.00459% for the normal prior.
4.2. Sample size calculations
Fig. 4 compares various strategies to determine the replication sample size for two-sided α=5%
and one-sided α̃=5% and original two-sided p-values po between 0.0001 and 0.05. The power
to achieve significance and replication success is fixed at 80%.
Standard (two-sided) sample size calculations based on conditional power give relative sample
sizes between 0.52 and 2, depending on the p-value po of the original study. Incorporating the
uncertainty from the original study based on predictive power gives relative sample sizes between
0.61 and 3.7.
The required relative sample size for two-sided replication success is larger than that for
significance alone and depends more drastically on the p-value po of the original study. First
consider the case of conditional power. If po is smaller than 0.001, the relative sample size c
required is smaller than 1, so the replication sample size nr does not need to be larger than
the original sample size no. However, the sample size required explodes for larger p-values
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with an asymptote around po = 0:012. This highlights the difficulty of achieving 80% power
for replication success with original p-values between 0.01 and 0.05. Even larger sample sizes
are required based on predictive rather than conditional power with an asymptote around
po =0:005.
The curves shift a little to the right when we assess replication success in a one-sided fashion,
pushing the asymptotes towards po =0:035 for conditional and po =0:017 for predictive power.
The predictive power asymptotes are remarkably close to the corresponding thresholds 0.0056
and 0.02 for intrinsic credibility, which are also shown in Fig. 4. Of course, the asymptotes
would change for power values that are different from 80%.
5. Replication success in psychological science
I now reanalyse data from the Open Science Collaboration (2015) project, which is a multi-
year endeavour that replicated 100 scientific studies that were selected from three prominent
psychology journals. Effect sizes have been transformed to correlation coefficients ρ̂ where
application of Fisher’s z-transformation θ̂ = tanh−1.ρ̂/ justifies a normal assumption with the
































Fig. 5. Application to the Open Science Collaboration (2015) data: the circles represent the effect estimates
(correlations) of the original and replication studies; the size of the circles represents the predictive power for
replication success at the two-sided 5% level (small, 20%; medium, 50%; large, 80%); replication success
and significance are also assessed at the two-sided 5% level and indicated by the colour of the circles ( ,
replication success .n D 11/; , both studies significant, but no replication success .n D 10/; , only orginal
study significant .nD44/; , original study not significant .nD8/)
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Table 1. Results for the 24 most successful replication studies with pS 0:15, as listed in the
last column†
Study Results for Results for Results for
original study replication study replication success
no ρ̂o po nr ρ̂r pr Power (%) pS
1 126 0.68 < 0:0001 177 0.76 < 0:0001 > 99:9 < 0:0001
2 78 0.77 < 0:0001 38 0.65 < 0:0001 > 99:9 < 0:0001
3 30 0.70 < 0:0001 31 0.78 < 0:0001 95.3 0.0005
4 174 0.29 0.0001 141 0.32 < 0:0001 82.6 0.005
5 32 0.57 0.0005 32 0.65 < 0:0001 78.7 0.007
6 22 0.71 < 0:0001 22 0.68 0.0003 87.6 0.008
7 38 0.62 < 0:0001 39 0.48 0.002 93.7 0.011
8 30 0.69 < 0:0001 27 0.53 0.004 92.1 0.015
9 117 0.21 0.023 236 0.50 < 0:0001 14.0 0.033
10 23 0.67 0.0003 31 0.47 0.007 88.4 0.038
11 9 0.72 0.026 18 0.92 < 0:0001 9.3 0.048
12 154 0.36 < 0:0001 50 0.28 0.045 69.7 0.052
13 40 0.37 0.017 95 0.41 < 0:0001 29.0 0.06
14 11 0.70 0.014 11 0.75 0.006 28.9 0.067
15 25 0.59 0.001 33 0.40 0.022 76.7 0.072
16 41 0.52 0.0004 41 0.32 0.044 79.6 0.08
17 9 0.74 0.021 16 0.70 0.002 18.9 0.091
18 33 0.56 0.0005 21 0.40 0.071 64.5 0.096
19 33 0.38 0.029 72 0.38 0.0009 4.3 0.10
20 25 0.45 0.025 39 0.42 0.007 10.9 0.10
21 57 0.33 0.011 118 0.23 0.014 44.5 0.11
22 96 0.20 0.057 243 0.25 < 0:0001 0.0 0.12
23 16 0.65 0.005 13 0.50 0.085 45.9 0.13
24 69 0.35 0.003 178 0.15 0.045 78.0 0.14
†The penultimate column gives the predictive power for replication success at level α=5%.
standard error being a function only of the nominal study sample size n: se.θ̂/ = 1=
√
.n−3/,
so the effective sample size is n − 3 with variance ratio c = .nr − 3/=.no − 3/. Effective sample
sizes are available for 73 studies: the so-called meta-analytic subset (Johnson et al., 2016). Two-
sided p-values po and pr have been calculated assuming normality of the corresponding test
statistics to = θ̂o=se.θ̂o/ and tr = θ̂r=se.θ̂r/ respectively. I have not included the remaining 27
studies where a normal approximation is questionable since the standard errors of θ̂o and θ̂r are
not available.
Fig. 5 displays the replication versus the original correlation estimates. Eight of the 73 original
studies are not significant at the standard α = 5% level, three of them with p-values between
0.05 and 0.06. There have been 21 significant replication studies following from the 65 signifi-
cant original studies. The sceptical p-value enables us to rank the studies by the degree of
replication success. Table 1 lists the 24 most successful replication studies with pS  0:15 of
which the top 11 have been successful at the two-sided 5% level (pS  0:05). The remaining
13 studies in Table 1 (with pS > 0:05) show some interesting features. For example, study 18
has a non-significant replication result but still leads to replication success at the 10% level.
Conversely, there are several studies with both po  0:05 and pr  0:05 but pS > 0:10. This
illustrates, once again, that the sceptical p-value not only takes significance of the original and
replication study into account, but also effect and sample sizes, both entering in the variance
ratio c.
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Table 1 also gives the predictive power for replication success at the two-sided 5% level: a
function of po and c only. Studies 11 and 24 are particularly interesting, both having significant
original and replication results. Replication study 11 has a very low predictive power of 9.3% but
still leads to pS =0:048 because the estimated correlation in the replication study is even larger
than in the original study (0.92 versus 0.72) and the replication p-value is very small (pr <0:0001).
In contrast, replication study 24 has a reasonably large power of 78.0% but leads to pS =0:14,
because there is substantial shrinkage of the effect estimate (0.15 versus 0.35) combined with
borderline significance only (pr =0:045). The two studies can be easily identified in Fig. 5.
6. Discussion
Science would proceed more efficiently if statistical approaches to inference are better aligned
with scientific needs and practice (Goodman, 2016). The traditional dichotomy between
‘Bayesians’ and ‘frequentists’ may not always be useful to achieve this. The proposed methodo-
logy in this paper represents a Bayes–non-Bayes compromise (Good, 1992) for extracting more
insight from replication studies based on standard metrics (effect estimates, confidence intervals
and p-values). Instead of synthesizing original and replication study results through a meta-
analysis, the original study result is challenged with the sufficiently sceptical prior. Replication
success is then defined as conflict between the sufficiently sceptical prior and the replication effect
estimate. Whereas the ordinary p-value quantifies the conflict between the point null hypothesis
and the replication data, the sceptical p-value quantifies the conflict between the sufficiently
sceptical prior and the replication data. It extends the ordinary p-value of the replication study
by taking into account effect and sample sizes of the two studies.
Just as the ordinary p-value is an indirect measure of the evidence against the null hypothesis,
the sceptical p-value is an indirect measure of the degree of replication success. Specifically, a
large sceptical p-value can occur if the replication sample size was too small, even if the original
and replication effect sizes are approximately equal, and should not be taken as evidence for
no effect (Altman and Bland, 1995). This is not the only reason why it would be interesting to
compare the sceptical p-value with direct ‘forward Bayes’ approaches, such as the replication
Bayes factor (Verhagen and Wagenmakers, 2014; Ly et al., 2018), which quantifies the change
in evidence that is brought about by observing the results from the replication study, given that
the evidence from the original study is already available.
Significance of both the original and the replication study is a necessary but not sufficient
requirement for replication success. The framework proposed thus extends the ‘two-pivotal-
studies paradigm’ requiring two significant findings from two independent confirmatory trials
for regulatory drug approval; see Kennedy-Shaffer (2017) for a recent review. However, the
difficulty of achieving replication success if the evidence from the original study is only suggestive
underlines the need for more stringent p-value thresholds for claims of new discoveries. The
threshold for intrinsic credibility (13) is a natural choice for this task.
It would be interesting to extend the approach to a setting where several replication studies are
available. For example, a summary estimate based on a meta-analysis of all available replication
studies may be used to assess replication success. If results from replication studies become
sequentially available, an alternative approach is first to combine original and replication effect
estimates into a summary measure. Some downweighting of the original study result will in
general be required depending on the degree of conflict between the original and replication
study result, e.g. with adaptive power priors (Gravestock and Held, 2017). The summary measure
could then be used as a new ‘original’ effect estimate to assess the success of a second replication
study. This would open up new ways to challenge existing knowledge iteratively through a
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series of replication studies and would provide an interesting alternative to traditional evidence
synthesis methods.
The reverse Bayes approach proposed assumes a simple mathematical framework, where
likelihood, prior and posterior are all assumed to be normal. It will be of interest to extend this
framework to other settings, e.g. to the binomial or t-distribution.
7. Data and software availability
Data that were analysed in this paper were originally from Open Science Collaboration (2015)
and have been downloaded from https://osf.io/fgjvw/. Software to compute the scep-
tical p-value and the power or required sample size to achieve replication success are available in
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so the requirement t2Box  z
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 c+ t2o=z2α=2 −1:
Subtracting t2o=z
2
α=2 −1 on both sides leads to equation (5).
Appendix B: The limiting cases σ2o # 0 and σ
2
r # 0
Equation (8) can be rewritten as
c−1
t2A























For σ2o ↓0 we thus have .c−1/=t2A →0 and t2H →2t2r so equation (15) reduces to 2z2S =2t2r and hence z2S = t2r .
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which is equation (10) with d = θ̂2r =θ̂
2
o.
Appendix C: Proof of result (11)
Equation (9) reduces for c↓0 to













|t2o − t2r |
2
=min{t2o, t2r }:































where the middle line follows from equation (8) and the last line also holds for c=1. It is easy to see from
equation (9) that .c−1/z2S + t2A > 0 for all c, and therefore equation (16) is negative for all c.
Appendix D: Proof of results in Section 4
For notational simplicity I omit the conditioning on θ̂o in what follows. Equation (14) implies a distribution





























Therefore t2r = {.no +nr/=no}t̃
2
r follows a scaled non-central χ
2-distribution with 1 degree of freedom,




Things simplify somewhat for a point prior θ= θ̂o at the estimate from the original study. Then θ̂r | θ̂o ∼
N.θ̂o, κ
2=nr/ so tr ∼N.
√
nrθ̂o=κ, 1/. Now t
2
r follows a non-central χ
2-distribution with 1 degree of freedom
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